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COMMENTS
A NEW LOOK AT LMAURITZEN V LARSEN, CHOICE OF LAW
AND FORUM NON CONVENIENS
The foreign seaman's suit in admiralty in the courts of the United
States is often more complicated at the outset with procedural problems
than with substantive ones. The courts' power to assume jurisdiction
over a foreign seaman's suit in admiralty is very broad,' so broad in fact
that some self-imposed limitations must be exercised to prevent litigants
having minimal contacts with the United States from swelling court
dockets with their disputes. 2 The procedural concept for this self-im-
posed reticence to retain a suit for trial notwithstanding the court's
power to do so when a more appropriate forum for trial exists elsewhere
is termed a dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds.3  While forum
non conveniens has been invoked by federal courts sitting in admiralty
for at least 175 years 4 the history of its application can be described as
erratic even granted that its exercise rests within a court's discretion.5  In
clearly domestic admiralty suits which present only the issue of which
United States forum is most convenient, the forum non conveniens doc-
trine has been clarified by statute and expounded upon specifically by
the United States Supreme Court.6 The same is not true for cases where
foreign seamen seek a United States forum for their maritime suits. 7
1. The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1855); Heredia v. Davies, 12 F.2d 500 (4th Cir.
1926). See also Motor Distributors, Ltd. v. Olaf Pedersen's Rederi A/S, 239 F.2d 463 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957); Burie v. Overseas Navigation Corp., 205 F. Supp.
182 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1963); Retzekas v. Vygla S.S. Co., S.A.,
193 F. Supp. 259 (D.R.I. 1960); Kontos v. Sophie C., 1960 A.M.C. 1344 (E.D. Pa. 1960); 1
M. NORRIs, THE LAW OF SEAMEN 16 (3d ed. 1970); Morrison, The Foreign Seaman andthe
Jones,4ct, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 16, 17 (1953). In admiralty basic powers ofjurisdiction are as-
sumed in any controversy if service of process can be effected. Cohn, Choice ofForum in
Maritime Personal Injury Torts, 54 ILL. B.J. 966, 969 (1966).
2. See generally Morrison, supra note 1.
3. "The doctrine is patterned upon the right of the court in the exercise of its equita-
ble powers to refuse the imposition upon its jurisdiction of the trial of cases even though
the venue is properly laid if it appears that for the convenience of litigants and witnesses
and in the interest of justice the action should be instituted in another forum where the
action might have been brought." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 783 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
4. Bickel, The Doctrine ofForum Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal Courts in
Matters ofAdmiralty: An Object Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 13
(1949), citing Willendson v. Forsoket, Fed. Cas. No. 17, 682 (D.C. Pa. 1801).
5. See Morley, Forum Non Conveniens: Restraining Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 68 Nw.
L. REV. 24, 26 (1973).
6. Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19 (1960); see 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) (1970).
7. Note, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 413, 414 (1975).
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The mere fact that a suitor is a foreign seaman does not bring into
play the doctrine of forum non conveniens.8 Foreign seamen's suits
broadly fall into two categories: those which involve a cause of action
based on the laws of the United States and those which do not. Forum
non conveniens as applied to foreign seamen is properly concerned only
with the latter class of cases, those in which a foreign seaman has no
cause of action based on the laws of the United States.9 When a foreign
seaman has a cause of action based on the laws of the United States the
seaman comes by right into the courts and the retention of his suit based
on domestic law should be mandatory.' 0 Retention of the suit is not
discretionary, because once the scope of United States law has been de-
fined the judiciary is not free to adjudicate selectively the effects of the
law. Therefore, the object of judicial inquiry at the outset of a foreign
seaman's suit is to determine the applicable law, " and only if United
States law is found not to govern the suit should the appropriateness of
the United States forum be examined.
The Supreme Court has on three occasions discussed the applicabil-
ity of United States law in a foreign seaman's suit. ' 2 Nevertheless, some
courts continue to blur the distinction between the inquiry necessary to
determine whether a foreign seaman's suit is to be heard by right in the
United States because federal law is applicable, and the different inquiry
appropriate for deciding whether a suit falls within the discretionary am-
bit of a forum non conveniens dismissal. 3 This comment will attempt
to delineate such a distinction within the context of the most common
cause of action a foreign seaman alleges in United States courts, mari-
time personal injuries.' 4 First, those cases in which a foreign seaman
has a cause of action based on United States law will be discussed.
8. See Morrison, supra note 1, at 17.
9. See Note, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 491, 499 (1970).
10. Robinson, Admiralty Law: The Plaintif's Choice of the Forum (pt. 2), 15 NACCA
L.J. 220, 231 (1955) [Hereinafter cited as Robinson Il]. Few, if any, cases will be found
that openly suggest that a suit should be dismissed if it is properly based on United States
law. Rather, the controversy is frequently framed in terms of whether United States law
applies at all, yet courts improperly apply forum non conveniens discretionary considera-
tions to proper law determination. It is the purpose of this comment to clearly delineate
separate considerations of choice of law and forum non conveniens.
11. See Robinson II, supra note 10, at 231.
12. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970); Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
13. Note, 44 TUL. L. REV. 347, 352 (1970).
14. For a discussion of the various causes of action a foreign seaman could claim in
the United States, see generally Bickel, supra note 4.
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Thereafter, the area of forum non conveniens will be explored in those
cases in which a foreign seaman's claim is not based on federal law.
A Federal Cause of Action
The critical issue in discussing whether United States law applies to
a foreign seaman's personal injury suit is the extent to which the Jones
Act I5 governs his cause of action. A literal reading of the Jones Act,
which grants a right for personal injury damages to "any seaman," sug-
gests that "a hand on a Chinese junk, never outside Chinese waters,
would not be beyond its literal wording."' 6 While an extremely forceful
argument can be made that Congress intended to protect any seaman in
an action against any employer regardless of the foreign nature of the
tort, 17 the courts' 8 and many commentators19 have taken the view that
Congress intended for the judiciary to interpret the term "any seaman."
Today, through a half-century of judicial interpretation, it is clear
that the Jones Act does not apply to "any seaman." The Jones Act has
always been applied to seamen, regardless of their nationality, if they
were injured aboard United States flag vessels. 20 The rationale for such
applications, in absence of express Congressional intent, can be easily
supported by the premise that Congress must have intended the Jones
Act to apply at the very least to its citizens' ships, but early cases also
buttressed their opinions with the international conflict of law notion
that the law of the flag should govern the law which was to be applied.2'
15. Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by
jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the
common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall
apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury
the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law
with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States
conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees
shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district
in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located.
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920).
16. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577 (1953).
17. Harolds, Some Legal Problems Arising out of Foreign Flag Operations, 28 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 295, 309 (1959).
18. E.g., Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234 (1931).
19. E.g., Morrison, supra note 1; Comment, Admiralty-Conflict of Laws--Application
ofthe JonesAct, 53 MICH. L. REv. 100 (1954); Note, 49 N.C.L. REv. 320 (1971).
20. Comment, Admiralty-Conflict ofLaws-Application of the Jones Act, 53 MICH. L.
REV. 100 (1954).
21. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 405 (1934).
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When non-United States flag vessels were involved in a foreign seaman's
suit, however, a whole range of domestic and international conflict of
law principles was applied by the early courts to determine the possible
applicability of the Jones Act. Nevertheless, the clear trend in these
cases was steadily toward a very broad application of the Jones Act
based on minimum points of contact of foreign interests with the United
States. 22
In an attempt to bring some order to the Jones Act's application to
foreign seamen injured aboard foreign ships, in 1953 the Supreme Court
decided the case of Lauritzen v. Larsen.23 In Lauritzen, a Danish sea-
man was injured in Cuban waters aboard a Danish flag vessel registered
in Denmark, and the sole American contact the seaman alleged was that
he signed his Danish language employment contract in the United
States. The foreign seaman argued that his employer's "doing business"
in the United States was sufficient to render the employer liable for dam-
ages under the Jones Act.24 The Supreme Court held that the foreign
seaman was not protected by the Jones Act, and in so doing the Court
took occasion to discuss and evaluate many of the various conflict of law
principles that various lower courts had used to justify applying the
Jones Act to foreign seamen. Before adopting or rejecting any specific
principle, the Court appropriately held that the Congressional intent in
enacting the Jones Act was for the act to operate within the context of
international conflict of law principles.25
The Court's discussion of the various conflict of law principles was
organized in a deceptive "list" of seven principles which some lower
courts regarded as an organic quantitative test.26 Rather than establish-
ing a quantitative test in which several factors are weighed to determine
the applicability of United States law, the Lauritzen Court endeavored
to discuss primarily the two major conflict of law principles then in use
in the United States in this context: the law of the place where the tort
was committed, or lex loci delici commissi,27 and the law of the flag.
22. See the early judicial trend in Jones Act litigation discussion in Comment, Admi-
ralty--Conflict of Laws-Application ofthe Jones Act, 53 MICH. L. REV. 100 (1954).
23. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
24. The foreign employer moved for dismissal on subject matter jurisdictional
grounds. 345 U.S. at 575. This is the usual method of excepting to a foreign seaman's
allegation of Jones Act applicability. Note, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 491, 492 (1970).
25. 345 U.S. at 577.
26. Cf DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1977) ("[o]f the seven
factors discussed in Lauritzen the first six concededly point toward the inapplicability of
American law to the instant death claim").
27. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1056 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
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Holding the law of the flag to be the governing principle in most cases,
the Court then discussed two contacts with the United States, either one
of which could override this major principle-the litigant's domicile in
the United States and the litigant's allegiance to the United States. Fi-
nally the court discussed those litigant contacts with the United States
which would never override the law of the flag application.
A primary conflict principle for land based torts is that the lex loci
delicti commissi governs the law to be applied in a foreign litigant's
suit, 28 and it was entirely appropriate for the Court to begin its discus-
sion with this principle. Although place of wrongful act was irrelevant
in this case and had not been raised by the parties, the Court emphasized
the importance of clarifying the issue because of earlier cases which had
held that a United States locus of a foreign seaman's injury was sufficient
contact to warrant application of the Jones Act. 29 The Court held that
the place of wrongful act has little or no significance to torts committed
on board ship for a host of reasons, consistency in the application of law
to foreign litigants being the primary consideration. 30 A necessary con-
comitant to foreign commerce is visitation by nationals of one country to
ports of many others, and commerce is hindered if the rights and respon-
sibilities of seaman and shipowner vacillate from port to port pursuant to
municipal law.
The Court held that in personal injury suits brought by foreign
seamen, the law of the flag was the recognized international conflict of
law principle which should determine the applicable law. 3 1 The law of
the flag offers a consistency to foreign seamen which lex loci delicti can-
not and is historically associated with the nationality of the litigants. 32
This latter consideration may not still be fact today, but the consistency
of law rationale remains sound. 33
28. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 384 (1959) ("the
place of injury has often been deemed determinative of the choice of law in municipal
conflict of laws"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 145 (1971).
29. See note 22, supra.
30. 345 U.S. at 584.
31. Id. at 585.
32. Id.
33. Prior to World War II the United States Government encouraged the use of
foreign flags of convenience on American ships to facilitate trade with allies and yet
technically abide by neutrality commitments. Comment, The Better Part of Valour- Ap-
plicability of the Jones Act to the Flags of Convenience Fleet, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 674
(1970). After the war American vessel owners discovered that they could cut operating
and labor costs dramatically by maintaining their flags of convenience and utilizing foreign
corporations to own their vessels nominally. See Harolds, Some Legal Problems Arising
Out of Foreign Flag Operations, 28 FoRDHAM L. REV. 295 (1959); Robinson, Admiralty
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However, the Court suggested in very specific language that either
of two factors could overcome the presumption that the law of the flag
governs a foreign seaman's suit.3 4 The Court noted that the United
States domicile or allegiance of the injured seaman could be an overrid-
ing consideration in favor of applying the Jones Act to foreigners. The
Court indicated that the parameters of this consideration needed careful
scrutiny, for the injured seaman in Lauritzen had resided temporarily in
New York prior to his injury, yet the Court held that this was not enough
to override the law of the flag.35 Furthermore, the Court noted that
allegiance or domicile of the shipowner, if such was the United States,
could override the flag considerations and make the Jones Act applicable
to foreign seamen because "a state 'is not debarred by any rule of inter-
national law from governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the
high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or
other nationals are not infringed.' 36
Finally, the Court discussed those conflict of law principles which
should have no bearing on choice of law problems in admiralty tort suits
between foreigners. Prior to Lauritzen, signing a contract in the United
States had been held to warrant application of the Jones Act when a
Law- The Plaintifl's Choice of the Forum, 14 NACCA L.J. 184 (1954); Shils, Flags of Neces-
sity, Flags of Convenience or Runaway Ships, 13 LAB. L.J. 1009 (1962); Note, 16 S.C.L. REV.
409 (1964). Today, a majority of the Liberian fleet is probably owned by Americans, and
the trend continues. See Robinson, supra; Shils, The "Flag of Necessity" Fleet and the
American Economy, 13 LAB. L.J. 151 (1962). While some favor a judicial weighing of
political factors in determining Jones Act applicability to a foreign flag ship (see, e.g.,
Note, 16 VILL. L. REV. 148 (1970)) to prevent the application of a popularly assumed "flag
nationality's" law to American ships (see Note, 36 TUL. L. REV. 319 (1962)), the entire
problem ought not be a subject of judicial consideration. Lauritzen noted that it was the
policy of the United States to assume that a vessel's registry with a foreign state is bona fide
unless questioned by that state. 345 U.S. at 584. The Lauritzen decision is certainly
broad enough to make allowances for American owners of foreign flag vessels without
creating new tests to determine the validity of a vessel's registration. See discussion in text
at note 35, infra. The case of Hellenic Lines Ltd v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970), is further
support for this proposition.
34. The Court stated that the law of the flag is to prevail "unless some heavy counter
weight appears." 345 U.S. at 586. Immediately following this statement the Court stated
"each nation has a legitimate interest that its nationals and permanent inhabitants be not
maimed or disabled from self-support," and noted that American courts currently applied
the Jones Act to United States domicilaries. Id. Finally, the Court declared an
equivalent interest in applying United States law to citizens of this country regardless of a
vessel's "foreign nominal registration," and noted the current practice of applying the
Jones Act to these persons by the courts. Id. at 587.
35. 345 U.S. at 587.
36. d.
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foreign seaman was also injured in United States waters. 37 The next
logical step was to assert, as the seaman in Lauritzen did, that an Ameri-
can situs for the contract by itself was enough to invoke the Jones Act.
The Court held that the place of contract is a consideration when con-
tractual rights are involved, not delictual ones, and dismissed the argu-
ment. 38 Dismissing a second confficts principle, the Court held that
inaccessibility of a foreign forum is a forum non conveniens considera-
tion which has no bearing on the proper application of law.39  The
Court also completely dismissed the argument that the law of the forum
has anything to do with the law to be applied in a suit between foreign-
ers. 40 Yet despite the Court's clear holding that place of contract, forum
accessibility, and law of the forum have no relevance in determining
Jones Act application to foreign suits, lower courts inexplicably continue
to discuss and "weigh" these factors in making this decision.4'
It is clear that the basic holding of Lauritzen has not been intention-
ally changed by the Supreme Court in subsequent years42 and that it
remains the leading decision in choice of law considerations for foreign
seamen. In Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co. ,43 the Court
reiterated its Lauritzen holding that the law of the flag governs choice of
law questions in preference to the locus delicti when a foreign seaman is
injured aboard a foreign-flag vessel in the United States and neither of
the overriding factors is present." The subsequent holding in Hellenic
Lines Ltd v. Rhoditis,45 that a foreign shipowner permanently domiciled
in the United States was a Jones Act employer for purposes of a foreign
seaman's personal injury suit, was also entirely consistent with Laurit-
zen's suggestion that the United States domicile or allegiance of a for-
eign shipowner could justify applying the Jones Act. However, in a four
page opinion, Justice Douglas used language in rendering the decision
which can be read to support a discretionary balancing test of the
37. Note, 44 TUL. L. REV. 347, 350 n.19 (1970).
38. 345 U.S. at 589.
39. Id. at 589-90.
40. Id. at 592.
41. See, e.g., Rode v. Sedco, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Tex. 1975); Burie v. Over-
seas Navigation Corp., 205 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 873 (2d Cir.
1963).
42. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 472 (2d ed. 1975).
43. 358 U.S. 354 (1959). See discussion of the case in Comment, United States: Suits
by Foreign Seamen; Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 508 (1960).
44. 358 U.S. at 384.
45. 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
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Lauritzen factors which a court may use in deciding whether to apply the
Jones Act.
The respondent in Rhoditis was a Greek national domiciled in the
United States who owned 95% of the stock in the Greek corporation
which managed a vessel on which a Greek seaman was injured. The
ship itself was fictionally owned by a Panamanian corporation whose
stock was also ultimately owned by the respondent. The respondent
could have been held to be a Jones Act employer because he was a
United States domiciliary, but instead Justice Douglas referred to the
Lauritzen discussion of conflict of law principles as a test "in determin-
ing whether the Jones Act is applicable," and added the shipowner's
"base of operations" as "another factor of importance." Indeed, the
majority noted that "there well may be others"46 among the "factors" for
determining Jones Act coverage. Thus, while Lauritzen had discussed
conflict principles, the language in Rhoditis may have lent support to an
argument suggesting that Rhoditis changed the criteria to "contacts"
needed to apply the Jones Act to foreigners.
Lauritzen was misinterpreted by many courts47 and was confusing
in some respects,4 8 but at the very least the case held that the Jones Act
should not apply to foreign seamen injured on foreign flag vessels unless
either the shipowner or the injured seaman is domiciled in or bears alle-
giance to the United States. However, in post-Rhoditis litigation lower
courts are proceeding in diverse directions to find the applicable law for
foreign seamen's suits, a diversity due in large part to the almost paren-
thetical remarks in Rhoditis that a court decides choice of law questions
by considering unenumerated "factors" in a "test" of United States con-
tacts rather than by deferring to the international conflict of law princi-
ples discussed in Lauritzen. Two completely adverse federal circuit
trends can be observed in this context with both trends drawing support
from Rhoditis language.
The Rhoditis language was criticized soon after the case's rendering.
It was argued that virtually no contact of a foreign shipper with the
46. Id. at 309. Another manifestation of loose language in the decision is the Jus-
tice's statement, "The injury occurred here," in context appearing to support the holding.
Id. at 310. It can now be argued that there is Supreme Court authority for a lex loci
commissi choice of law determination notwithstanding Lauritzen and Romero. There al-
ready exists a post-Romero appellate suggestion that locus delicti is a valid consideration.
Gkiafis v. S.S. Yiosonas, 387 F.2d 460 (4th Cir. 1967).
47. Note the multiple uses to which the courts have put the Lauritzen criteria, as dis-
cussed in Note, 44 TUL. L. REV. 347, 352 (1970).
48. Morley, supra note 5; Note, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 413 (1975).
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United States would be found insignificant on this case's authority,49 and
Second Circuit cases, at least, are proving this argument to be prophetic.
In Antypas v. Cia. Maritima San Basilio, S.A. ,5 a foreign shipper with a
New York based managing agent was held sufficiently connected with
the United States under Rhoditis to warrant application of the Jones Act
to a suit brought by one of his injured foreign seamen.51 The Second
Circuit noted that the amount of business a foreign shipper derives from
the United States is significant for applying the Jones Act 52 even though
the Lauritzen court specifically held that business contacts alone are not
sufficient for a choice of law determination because the essence of the
shipping trade is foreign business contacts.5 3 However, the broadest ex-
tension of this reasoning thus far was made in Mattes v. NationalHellenic
American Lines, S.A. ,54 where a host of United States business "con-
tacts" by a foreign shipper was found sufficiently significant to warrant
application of the Jones Act to foreign shippers because "they put them-
selves in direct competition with American companies. '55
This trend is surely supported by some of the language in
Rhoditis,5 6 but has support in neither the theoretical framework of
49. Note, 49 N.C.L. REV. 320, 329 (1971) ("Extension of the reasoning applied in
Rhoditis would leave virtually no contact insufficient for the application of American law.
Maintenance of a United States office could be the critical factor rendering a legitimate
foreign shipper liable under the Jones Act.").
50. 541 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1976).
51. There were also suggestions by the majority that ownership of the vessel might be
partially vested in United States citizens. 541 F.2d at 310. However, the dissent noted a
complete lack of evidence in this respect, and the majority's decision apparently did not
rest on this basis. Id. at 310-11.
52. There are cases which have suggested that one-ship foreign companies taking on
cargo in the United States are doing all their business here at that time for Jones Act
purposes. Gkiafis v. S.S. Yiosonas, 387 F.2d 460 (4th Cir. 1967); Gomez v. Karavias
U.S.A., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Elefteriou v. Tanker Archontissa,
443 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1971).
53. 345 U.S. at 590 ("The 'doing business' which is enough to warrant service of proc-
ess may fall quite short of the considerations necessary to bring extraterritorial torts to
judgment under our law .... We have held it a denial of due process of law when a state
of the union attempts to draw into control of its law otherwise foreign controversies, on
slight connections, because it is a forum state.").
54. 427 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (United States bank accounts, marketing agents,
advertising, letter head mailings to parties in the United States, and past American crew
membership).
55. Id. at 626.
56. 398 U.S. at 310 ("We see no reason whatsoever to give the Jones Act a strained
construction so that this alien owner, engaged in an extensive business operation in this
country, may have an advantage over citizens engaged in the same business by allowing him to
escape the obligations and responsibility of a Jones Act 'employer.'" (emphasis added)).
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Lauritzen nor in legislative history. For example, the Senate Report 57
on a section of the Death on the High Seas Act,5 8 passed in close proxim-
ity to the Jones Act, states: "From a review of the authorities it is not
believed that the Congress has the power to create a substantive right of
action to recover damages against foreigners and their vessels for wrong-
ful death on the high seas."59 This legislative sentiment makes it en-
tirely unlikely that the Jones Act was ever meant to apply to foreign
seamen injured on foreign flag vessels unless the foreign litigants have
some personal connection with the United States.
Completely at odds with the Second Circuit trend is the Third Cir-
cuit case of DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc. 60 In this case the estate of a Pana-
manian seaman killed on the high seas brought suit under the Jones Act
against Texaco Panama, Inc., a Panamanian corporation that owned the
ship upon which the seaman met his death.61 The admitted ultimate
owner of all of the defendant's vessels was Texaco, Inc., a Delaware cor-
poration.62 Although admitting that its vessels regularly called at ports
in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, the defendant moved for a
dismissal of the plaintiffs suit on forum non conveniens grounds and the
nonapplicability of United States law.
Relator argued that the disguised base of operations of the entire
Texaco, Inc., enterprise was New York City and that ultimate United
States ownership interests made the Jones Act applicable under Rhoditis.
The trial court had rejected this argument even though the defendant's
main corporate officer in Panama was American, on grounds of "com-
ity" for a previous Panamanian court decision in the defendant's favor.
57. S. REP. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919).
58. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 is popularly referred to as the Death on the High Seas Act. It
was passed into law on March 20, 1920. The Jones Act in its present form was passed into
law on June 5, 1920.
59. S. REp. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1919). See also 59 CONo. REC. 4482
(1920).
60. 562 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1977).
61. A typical fact pattern [for flags of convenience] is as follows:
A vessel is owned and registered in Liberia by a Liberian corporation. The Liberian
corporation, with only a nominal office in Liberia, is wholly owned by a Panamanian
corporation, having only a nominal office in Panama. The Panamanian corporation
is wholly owned by a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New
York. The vessel is involved in shipping in and out of United States ports, and has
never been to Liberia.
Comment, The Better Part of Valour-Applicability of the Jones Act to the Flags of Conven-
ience Fleet, 7 SAN DIEoo L. REV. 674, 675 (1970).
62. See the district court case, DeMateos v. Texaco Panama, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 411
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
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Moreover, the lower court held that under Rhoditis ultimate United
States ownership of a foreign flag vessel renders shippers Jones Act em-
ployers only if a foreign shipowning corporation wholly owned by
United States citizens was specifically created to defeat application of
federal maritime law,6 3 and that the burden of showing this intent is on
the injured foreign seaman.64 In reaching its decision, the trial court
clearly viewed the various Rhoditis considerations as elements for it to
weigh in a discretionary decision whether to apply United States law and
retain the case for trial.65 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court's holding on all grounds.66
This case is clearly erroneous under the holding of Rhoditis alone,
but it is more significant for departing radically from the theory behind
Lauritzen. Rhoditis had actually presented a more arguable point to the
court than did DeMateos. The Rhoditis court held that a shipowner
domiciled in the United States was to be treated as a United States citi-
zen owning majority stock in a foreign corporation, who would in turn
be held to Jones Act standards of care for his seamen employees. The
only major difference in the facts of Rhoditis and DeMateos was that the
ultimate ownership of the foreign ship in Rhoditis was by a mere United
States domiciliary, while in DeMateos it was by United States citizens.
Prior to this decision there was little doubt that ultimate United States
ownership of a ship mandated the application of the Jones Act.67 As
one case held, retention of a Jones Act claim is not a matter of discretion
and either "the facts warrant the application of the Jones Act or they do
not."'6
8
The Second 69 and Third Circuit decisions, hopelessly irreconcilable
63. There is some commentary support for this argument. See, e.g., Comment,
Choice of Law and the Foreign Seaman Under the Jones Act, 1967 U. ILL. L. F. 639, 649
(1967).
64. This holding is much more developed in the district court case. 417 F. Supp. at
418.
65. Id. at 418.
66. 562 F.2d at 895. As extra weight for its holding the court noted that the plaintiff
had not proved that the specific ship upon which the deceased died derived substantial
revenue from United States trade and noted that there was no proof that United States
citizens actually owned a majority of stock in Texaco, Inc. of Delaware. Id. at 902.
67. Lekkas v. Liberian M/V Caledonia, 443 F.2d 10 (4th Cir. 1971); Bartholomew v.
Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959).
68. Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 1000 (1959).
69. Cases with fact patterns similar to DeMateos have reached an exactly opposite
result in the Second Circuit. Groves v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 826
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in result,70 are very similar in basic methodology. If a foreigner has a
cause of action based on United States law he comes by right into the
nation's courts and not by the discretion of a federal judge sitting in
admiralty.7' This is also the apparent belief in other maritime coun-
tries,72 and may be grounded in the belief that courts of a jurisdiction do
not have the option to apply municipal law on a selective basis when the
legislative intent of the law would otherwise direct its application.' The
Lauritzen holding lends support to this proposition because the Court
specifically held that Congress intended for the Jones Act to be applied
in the context of international conflict of law principles. Notwithstand-
ing this, the thrust of the trends of both circuits is that a foreign ship-
owner's United States contacts, evaluated on the unique criteria of each
circuit, should be considered in deciding whether to dismiss the seaman's
suit instead of appealing to the principles of international conflict of
laws. Gone is the consistency that the law to be applied to -a seaman
throughout his voyage is the law of the ship's flag. Gone is the consis-
tency of the Lauritzen test in determining when the Jones Act will apply.
What is left is a case-by-case and highly inconsistent analysis of the
"contacts" a foreign shipper may have with the United States and
whether they are sufficient to invoke the Jones Act. The courts may
have come full circle to the uncertainty of those pre-Lauritzen days.
A Foreign Cause ofAction
If the seaman's complaint alleges only United States law to be appli-
cable and subsequently federal law is found not to apply, the case must
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction73 because no recog-
nized cause of action has been pleaded before the federal court. This
was the result in both Lauritzen74 and Romero,75 because no court may
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Zielinski v. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, 113 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y.
1953). See also 67 HARV. L. REV. 340 (1953).
70. The DeMateos court acknowledged this fact. "We note that federal courts in the
Second Circuit have taken an expansive view on the question of the export of American
maritime law, viewing American stock ownership in a ship owning corporation as sufficient
to justify the extraterritorial application of the Jones Act." 562 F.2d at 902 n.3.
71. Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 1000 (1959). Morrison, supra note 1, at 17. See also Harolds, supra note 17; Note,
44 FORDHAM L. REV. 413 (1975).
72. Comment, Conflict of Laws-Forum Shopping-Forum Conpeniens, 52 CAN. B.
REV. 315, 327 (1974) (English maritime law).
73. See note 24, supra.
74. See note 24, supra.
75. 358 U.S. at 357 n.4. Note that Romero was a multi-party suit and the instant
discussion only concerns the seaman's Spanish employer.
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discuss the merits of retaining a suit for trial absent demonstrated juris-
diction over the subject matter.76 This is to be contrasted with the no-
tion that United States courts have almost unlimited power to assume
jurisdiction over a maritime controversy occurring anywhere in the
world. 77 In a situation where federal law is found not to apply the for-
eign seaman's task is to demonstrate to the court by specific pleadings
78
that it possesses subject matter jurisdiction over his case on another ba-
sis, t e., that of foreign law.79 Although there is no need categorically to
set forth specific foreign laws in the complaint,80 the mere allegation that
foreign law is applicable8 or that one is afforded a cause of action under
the laws of a certain country8 2 is not sufficient. Rather, the allegation
,must be substantive, and not conclusory,83 in setting out a cause of ac-
tion.
When the court clearly has subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign
seaman's personal injury suit not governed by United States law the
truly discretionary retention of the case for trial may be considered by
the court.84 Consideration of whether the forum is a convenient one for
the litigants is made necessary because the abuse of forum is a frequently
used trial tactic by plaintiffs to gain an unfair advantage over defend-
ants,85 but the consideration is not entirely one-sided due to defendants'
76. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947).
77. See note 1, supra, in the context of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. See also, e.g.,
Camarias v. M/V Lady Era, 318 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Va. 1969) (The court held it had
jurisdiction over a case involving the death of a foreign seaman on a foreign owned flag
vessel on the high seas even though neither the deceased nor the ship had ever visited the
United States. The case was, however, appropriately dismissed on the basis of forum non
conveniens.).
78. Supplemental Rule E(2)(a) states, "The complaint shall state the circumstances
from which the claim arises with such particularity that the defendant or claimant will be
able, without moving for a definite statement, to commence an investigation of the facts
and to frame a responsive pleading." This should be read in conjunction with FED. R.
Civ. P. 44.1, which requires foreign law to be pleaded specifically.
79. "[T]he rule is well settled that the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a
federal court must demonstrate that the case is within the competence of such a court." C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 17 (3d ed. 1976).
80. The Presidente Wilson, 30 F.2d 466 (D. Mass. 1929).
81. The Silverpalim, 79 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1935).
82. Fernandez v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 156 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
83. lafrate v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 106 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y.
1952).
84. See note 9, supra.
85. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) ("A plaintiff sometimes, is
under temptation to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for
an adversary, even at some inconvenience to himself.").
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use of forum non conveniens pleas to frustrate the plaintiffs most ideally
chosen forum.86
Forum non conveniens has no bearing on what law is to be used to
decide a case 87 because conflict of laws doctrine properly invoked in a
seaman's suit assures that the case will be decided under the appropriate
law regardless of the forum.88 Rather, forum non conveniens in the
United States is usually a plea by the defense that the logistical problem
of defending the suit in the United States is itself an injustice. 89 Al-
though the courts use a balancing of "inconvenience" as the basic meth-
odology in deciding the defense plea90 and seek to avoid general
injustice to either party,9' United States courts will not permit a plaintiff
to be inconvenienced more by granting the defense plea than the defense
would have been if the case had been retained for trial by the deciding
court.92 This is in marked contrast to the practice in some other coun-
tries where the "balance of convenience" test used envisions one ulti-
mately "proper" forum for the litigation, analogous to a proper venue,
and is apparently chosen by the court regardless of the inconvenience to
the plaintiff.93
In Gtuf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert94 the Supreme Court defined the
then non-statutory 95 limits for the application of forum non conveniens
among alternative United States forums in cases where United States
law applied. Noting that the doctrine is entirely appropriate in mari-
time matters,96 the Court discussed several factors which should be used
to gauge the appropriateness of the forum to the litigants, chief among
86. Cohn, supra note 1, at 973 ("One of the principal tactics available to the defendant
in a maritime case to frustrate the claimant's choice of forum" is a transfer of a case under
a forum non conveniens plea.).
87. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) (Supreme Court held that the
device is to effect "but a change of court rooms," not of applicable law). See also Note, 36
J. AIR L. & COM. 759 (1970).
88. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 591 (1953).
89. See a general discussion of the concept in Note, 36 J. AIR L. & COM. 759 (1970).
90. See Note, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 491 (1970).
91. Note, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 413, 420 (1975).
92. See Note, 36 J. AIR L. & COM. 759, 769 (1970).
93. E.g., Granger, The Conflit ofLaws and Forum Shopping- Some Recent Decisions
on Jurisdiction and Free Enterprise in Litigation, 6 OTTAWA L. REv. 416, 436 (1974) (Ca-
nada).
94. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) was subsequently passed and codified much of this holding.
See text at note 105, infra.
96. 330 U.S. at 508 ("The proposition that a court having jurisdiction must exercise it,
is not universally true; else the admiralty court could never decline jurisdiction on the
ground that the litigation is between foreigners.").
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which were whether the chosen forum was accessible to sources of proof,
had available compulsory process for witnesses, could view the premises
if necessary, and could enforce the judgment.97 The Court, in language
that provided a stronger presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of
forum than has been borne out subsequently in foreign seamen's suits,
held that "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. '98  Subsequently
the concepts of forum non conveniens were codified for purely domestic
cases9 9 involving alternate United States forums: "For the convenience
of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought. ' ' l°
Notwithstanding this general framework which could be applied in
a foreign seaman's personal injury suit, Lauritzen is inexplicably be-
lieved to be the "essential text" governing a court's decision to retain a
suit for trial.'0 1 It will be recalled that Lauritzen dealt largely with con-
ffict of law principles and only referred to one concept which it felt
would be applicable in rendering a forum non conveniens decision.'0 2
For example, it is doubtful that the flag a ship flies has anything to do
with whether the parties to a suit are inconvenienced by a United States
forum,10 3 and this is especially true when such flag represents neither the
domicile of the defendant nor the domicile of the plaintiff.'04 Likewise
irrelevant to a forum non conveniens holding should be the fact that a
seaman signed the shipping articles in the United States for the voyage
on which he was injured, but this conflict of law principle is often con-
97. 330 U.S. at 508.
98. Id.
99. The Supreme Court has never decided a case concerning forum non conveniens in
a suit between foreigners in admiralty, and subsequent to the passage of 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) discussions of the concept in general have been venue problems associated with
changes of forum within the United States. See Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585,
364 U.S. 19 (1960). Thus, forum non conveniens in the foreigner's case is not completely
analogous to domestic problems of the same general nature, because 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is
a change of venue provision.
100. See general discussion of the statute in Cohn, supra note 1, at 969-70.
101. Compare G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 472 (2d ed. 1975)
with id. at 482.
102. That concept was inaccessibility of a foreign alternate forum. See text at note 39,
s.upra.
103.' Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970); Southern Cross S.S. Co. v.
Firipis, 285 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1960).
104. Groves v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Yee Ying
Ching v. M/V Maratha Endeavour, 301 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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fused by the courts as bearing on their discretion to retain a suit for
trial. 105
However, Lauritzen did note the forum non conveniens factor of
inaccessibility of alternate forums 0 6 as one factor which a court should
consider in deciding whether to retain a foreign seaman's suit for trial.1
0 7
Lauritzen had not discussed the place of injury as a forum non con-
veniens concept, but the holding of GuifOil was at least implicitly to the
effect that the forum in which a tort occurs is usually the most appropri-
ate in which to try a suit resulting from it.10 8 These two factors are
perhaps most significant in any forum non conveniens discussion.
That a seaman is injured within the territorial waters of the United
States ought to be a very weighty factor in favor of retaining a suit for
trial in the United States. For example, a ship explosion in a United
States harbor, where United States agencies perform relief services and
investigate the accident, might create evidentiary difficulties if tried in a
far removed foreign court.109 United States hospitalization of a seaman
with easy accessibility to medical records for trial as well as the acquisi-
tion of accident details should be major factors favoring retention of a
foreign seaman's suit for trial.1 0  Nevertheless, this argument has not
always been successful.' I Conversely, that an injury occurred on the
high seas should be irrelevant in deciding whether the United States is a
convenient forum for the parties to litigate a controversy;' 12 neverthe-
less, a high seas injury moots completely a locus de/icti argument for
holding trial in the United States. A possible exception to this reasoning
arises when a foreign seaman injured on the high seas initiates his suit by
an in rem seizure 13 of the vessel on which he received his injuries. The
105. Eg., Rode v. Sedco, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Tex. 1975); Burie v. Overseas
Navigation Corp., 205 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aft'd, 323 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1963).
106. See text at note 39, supra.
107. See text at note 101, supra.
108. 330 U.S. at 508.
109. See, e.g., Erazo v. M/V Ciudad de Neiva, 270 F. Supp. 211 (D. Md. 1967).
110. See, e.g., Gkiafis v. S.S. Yiosonas, 387 F.2d 460 (4th Cir. 1967); Conte v. Flota
Mercante Del Estado, 277 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1960). It should be noted that this criterion
can work both ways. In Downer v. Floa Mercanle Grancolombiana, S.A. 1963 A.M.C. 698
(C.P. 1963), the court declined jurisdiction precisely because medical testimony was more
readily available in another jurisdiction.
111. E.g., In Re Complaint of Lidoriki Maritime Corp., 404 F. Supp. 1402 (E.D. Pa.
1975).
112. Alegria v. Grand Bassa Tankers, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Yee Ying
Ching v. M/V Maratha Endeavour, 301 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Va. 1968).
113. See discussion of the various ways jurisdiction over the parties is perfected by
seamen in Cohn, supra note 1, at 969.
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court may find that, although the tort occurred while the vessel was on
the high seas, the place of the tort, i. e., the vessel itself, is then within the
court's territorial limits of effective service with opportunity for all par-
ties to investigate the facts of the injury and to collect other evidence." 14
The consideration that alternative forums must be available to the
foreign seaman if his suit is to be dismissed, as discussed in Lauritzen
and developed analogously by statute, has been taken into account by
some courts in retaining a foreign seaman's suit over forum non con-
veniens objections.1 5 This is largely a factual determination, although
it is complicated by arguments that an alternate forum does not exist for
a foreign seaman's case when the only alternate forum available has pre-
viously precluded his chances for recovery by a judicial opinion." 6 An-
other closely related legal concept concerns the appropriateness of a
dismissal of a maritime suit in rem on forum non conveniens grounds at
all. 1 7 The availability of the vessel on which the seaman was injured
for both security and evidentiary reasons might be jeopardized irrepara-
bly by a deferral of his suit to trial in a foreign country." 8
A third major consideration which could make the United States the
most appropriate forum to litigate a foreign seaman's personal injury
suit is the presence of either litigant in this country. The implications of
United States domicile of a litigant on choice of law have been re-
viewed, 19 but it is clear that a contact less than domicile or allegiance by
114. In an in rem delictual action the fictitious offender is the ship itself. See G. GIL-
MORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 616 (2d ed. 1975).
115. Eg., Georgoussis v. Extramar Panama, S.A., 194 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Gonzales v. D/S/K Dania A.S., 108 F. Supp. 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
116. Compare Robinson, Admiralty Law. The Plaintiff's Choice of the Forum, 14
NACCA L.J. 184, 194 (1954) with DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1977).
117. In a domestic maritime context it has been debated whether a court can order a
change of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) of an in rem suit pursuant to that statute's
requirement that the change be to a court where the original suit "might have been
brought." Obviously, if a suit in rem was instituted by a seizure in one court's district at a
given time, it could not have been instituted in another district at the same time because the
ship was not present. Hughes v. S.S. Santa Irene, 209 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Leith
v. S.S. Rocroi, 203 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Tex. 1962). The Supreme Court has rejected such
technical niceties in maritime forum non conveniens actions both in rem and in personam.
Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 23 (1960) ("A fiction born to pro-
vide convenient forums should not be transferred into a weapon to defeat that very pur-
pose."). Nevertheless, the controversy over strictly in rem suits continues. See Cohn, supra
note 1, at 974.
118. An in rem proceeding in Canada often precludes the applicability of forum non
conveniens. Comment, Conflict oLaws--Forum Shopping--Forum Conveniens, 52 CAN.
B. REV. 315, 327 (1974).
119. See text at note 34, supra.
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a litigant within the United States, although not sufficient to constitute
an overriding factor in applying United States law to a controversy in
preference to the law of the flag, can yet be quite significant in retaining
a suit for trial in the United States over a defendant's forum non con-
veniens exception.' 20 Thus, the residence of a foreign seaman in the
United States either beforel 21 or after 122 his injury arguably should pre-
clude the application of forum non conveniens to his suit for personal
injuries because it is unlikely that the defendant's inconvenience could
be remedied without inconveniencing the plaintiff more.1 23 Likewise,
the corporate presence of the defendant vessel owner in the United
States, insufficient to require application of United States law, may be
sufficient to deny a forum non conveniens finding, because an interna-
tional corporation with business and legal ties world-wide will not in fact
find the United States an inconvenient forum to try an injured seaman's
suit.
There are other possible considerations to be weighed in deciding a
forum non conveniens question. The rather nebulous charge in 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a), dealing with United States venue, that a judge effect
"the interest of justice"'124 in deciding the question could lead a court by
analogy to examine the varied remedies a seaman has in other jurisdic-
tions125 and to keep the case because of the prospect of a perceived 126
inequitable result for the seaman. 127 A fear of foreign injustice1 28 and a
"neutral forum" view of the United States ought not to be weighty con-
120. See Bickel, supra note 4, at 29.
121. Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 1000 (1959); Rode v. Sedco, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Tex. 1975); Muoio v. Italian
Line, 228 F. Supp. 290 (E.D. Pa. 1964); McMurchie v. S.S. Valmar, 1958 A.M.C. 2280
(E.D.N.Y. 1958); Gantuz v. Dominican S.S. Line, 22 Misc. 2d 567, 198 N.Y.S.2d 421
(N.Y.M. 1960). See also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 476 (2d ed.
1975).
122. Argyropoulos v. S.S. Manes, 1961 A.M.C. 2644 (E.D. Va. 1961).
123. See text at note 93, supra. See also Erazo v. M/V Ciudad de Neiva, 270 F. Supp.
211 (D. Md. 1967), where the financial burden of bringing suit in such a far removed place
was cited.
124. See implications of the concept of "justice" in forum non conveniens discussed in
Harolds, supra note 17, at 314.
125. See Comment, United Srates: Suits by Foreign Seamen; Jurisdiction and Choice of
Law, 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 508, 511 (1960), where the diverse remedies available to seamen in
the Atlantic community countries are discussed.
126. Eg., Karros v. S.S. Liryc, 247 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Va. 1965); Burie v. Overseas
Navigation Corp., 205 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), af'd, 323 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1963).
127. See Note, I ST. MARY'S L.J. 247, 254 (1969), where "equity" is advocated as a
criteria for applying United States law to foreigners.
128. This fear is discussed in Morley, supra note 5, at 42.
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siderations in this matter because such considerations both contemplate
applicable law rather than litigant convenience and invite other coun-
tries to adopt equally jingoistic rationalizations.' 29
Additionally, the general forum non conveniens principle that a
case should not be dismissed if judicial economy would be served by
retaining it13° has spurred an entire line of cases holding that a foreign
seaman's entire personal injury claim must be entertained in the United
States if the seaman alleges that it is pendent to a disputed wage claim
against the same foreign employer. The right of a seaman of any na-
tionality to claim unpaid wages from his employer on the basis of a lien
against his vessel' 3 ' has been consistently recognized in western mari-
time nations since the Rules of Oleron, 132 and federal statutory law spe-
cifically grants foreign seamen the right to enforce wage claims in the
courts of the United States.' 33 It is widely held that a court may not
refuse to entertain a foreign seaman's suit to collect his wages.' 34 Rea-
soning that a pendent claim of personal injuries should not be divorced
from a compulsory claim for wage payment, the Second, Third and
Fourth Circuits have all accepted foreign seamen's general maritime in-
jury claims as pendent to their statutory wage claims. In the Second
129. Cf Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953) (where the Court stated, "[We
cannot be unmindful of the necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be
avoided; nor should we forget that any contact we hold sufficient to warrant application of
our law to a foreign transaction will logically be as strong a warrant for a foreign country to
apply its law to an American transaction."). See also the retaliation problem discussed in
Note, 49 N.C.L. REV. 320 (1971).
130. Gkiafis v. S.S. Yiosonas, 387 F.2d 460 (4th Cir. 1967).
131. See Pelaez, The Wages of Seamen, 53 TEX. L. REV. 1410 (1975), where the entire
spectrum of seamen's wages and the modes of their enforcement is fully discussed.
132. Runyan, The Rolls of Oleron and the Admiralty Court in Fourteenth Century
England, 19 AM. J. L. HIST. 95, 101 (1975).
133. 46 U.S.C. § 596 requires in part that the master of any vessel, even foreign ones,
tender wages at "the time such seaman is discharged" or within twenty-four hours after the
cargo has been discharged. The penalty for the refusal to tender such wages is a sum paya-
ble to the seaman equivalent to two days' pay for each day payment is prolonged. 46
U.S.C. § 597 entitles every seaman, including foreign seamen while in United States ports,
to receive "on demand" one-half of the balance of wages earned and due at every port
where his vessel "shall load or deliver cargo before the voyage is ended." 46 U.S.C. § 599
makes all advances of unearned wages to a seaman a crime whether committed within or
without the jurisdiction of the United States.
134. Monteiro v. Sociedad Maritima San Nicolas, S.A., 280 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1960);
Burie v. Overseas Navigation Corp., 205 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 873
(2d Cir. 1963); Heros v. Cockinos, 177 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1949). See also S.S. Fletero v.
Arias, 206 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1953); Lascaratos v. S/T Olympic Flame, 227 F. Supp. 161
(E.D. Pa. 1964).
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Circuit case of Conte v. Floa Mercante 35 the court granted a foreign
seaman relief for causes of action based on negligence, unseaworthiness,
breach of warranty, maintenance and cure, and counsel fees on the basis
of his statutory wage claim, but was careful to note that such pendent
action was solely within the discretion of the court. Third Circuit courts
have made similar findings, 136 but the Fourth Circuit has been the pri-
mary haven for foreign seamen seeking pendent jurisdiction for their
personal injuries. In Katelouzos v. Othem, 137 a district court in the Cir-
cuit observed that "[t]he tendency in this circuit is to retain jurisdiction
for all purposes where there is a bonafide wage claim existing at the time
of the filing of the libel."' 38 The "tendency" to accept such pendent
claims was subsequently extended into a "general rule" by various ap-
pellate panels in the Fourth Circuit.' 39
From a forum non conveniens perspective the tendency of a court to
retain a personal injury cause of action pendent to a foreign seaman's
wage claim has merit if the two causes of action are related in the same
general factual context and time frame. 140 A foreign employer will nec-
essarily have to undergo some expense in defending the wage claim in
the United States, and he can hardly argue that it is more convenient for
him to incur double legal expenses in defending the wage claim in the
United States and the personal injury claim in a foreign forum. There is
a point, however, when forum non conveniens factors may become ob-
scured by strict application of pendent jurisdiction rules, 14 1 as was
demonstrated in one Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals case142 which held
that a good faith wage claim by a foreign seaman may be dismissed as
meritless and his pendent personal injury claims nevertheless stand for
trial.
The above considerations of locus delicti, alternate forums, domicile
of the litigants, and judicial economy are not the exclusive factors in a
court's decision whether to grant a forum non conveniens dismissal of a
135. 277 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1960).
136. Lodakis v. Oceanic Petroleum S.S. Co., 223 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
137. 176 F. Supp. 954 (E.D. Va. 1959).
138. Id. at 955.
139. Bekris v. Greek M/V Aristoteles, 437 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1971); Gkiafis v. S.S.
Yiosonas, 387 F.2d 460 (4th Cir. 1967). See also S.S. Fletero v. Arias, 206 F.2d 267 (4th
Cir. 1953); Heros v. Cockinos, 177 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1949).
140. In Grevas v. M/V Olympic Pegasus, 557 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1977), the court accepted
the argument that a seaman who leaves the ship for medical reasons is "discharged" pursu-
ant to 46 U.S.C. § 596.
141. See a criticism of this practice in Comment, United States: Suits By Foreign
Seamen Jurisdiction and Choice ofLaw, 9 AM. J. COMP. L. 508, 515 (1960).
142. Gkiafis v. S.S. Yiosonas, 387 F.2d 460 (4th Cir. 1967).
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foreign seaman's personal injury suit. The Supreme Court in Gu/f Oil
noted that such localized considerations as court docket crowding and
jury tolerance in entertaining foreign suits should also enter the decision
making process. 43 Additionally, the discretionary element of a forum
non conveniens decision' 44 should allow a court leeway in considering
specific factors unique to a given case. As a practical matter, this defer-
ence to the wisdom of a district court may have been restricted to some
extent, at least in the Fourth Circuit, by the rule that a district court must
in all circumstances retain personal injury claims pendent to a foreign
seaman's wage claim.
Conclusion
This comment has attempted to demonstrate when the doctrine of
forum non conveniens is appropriately invoked in a foreign seaman's
personal injury suit by discussing which elements of such a case involve
the discretion of a court sitting in admiralty and which do not. How-
ever, before one can discuss the proper application of forum non con-
veniens, the proper law to be applied in a case must always be
considered, because if the legislature has mandated the application of
United States law to foreign seamen in certain circumstances the judici-
ary is not free to choose selectively to which foreign seamen and in
which circumstances it will apply that mandated law. Forum non con-
veniens in the international context means more than a simple change of
venue as envisioned in the United States Code. In the international
context it means remanding a seaman's suit to a forum which in all like-
lihood will not apply United States law to the case at all. Thus, if the
legislature has intended that foreign seamen benefit from United States
law in certain circumstances, it is mandatory on the courts that they dis-
pense the law in accordance with its intent.
However, it is not clear from a reading of the Jones Act, the major
substantive law concerning seamen, to what extent the statute was meant
to apply to foreign seamen. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the legislative intent of the Act to require that it be applied in the
context of traditional international conflict of laws, and furthermore has
indicated that the maritime principle of law of the flag is to govern the
applicable law unless overridden by the United States domicile or alle-
giance of one of the litigants. This announcement of principle appears
143. 330 U.S. at 508 (categorized as factors of "public interest").
144. Id. ("Wisely, it has not been attempted to catalogue the circumstances which will
justify or require either grant or denial of remedy. The doctrine leaves much to the discre-
tion of the court to which plaintiff resorts .... ").
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solid enough, but, in part due to dicta in the Supreme Court's Rhoditis
opinion, various courts have now launched on a contacts theory of ap-
plying the Jones Act to foreign seamen based on the significance of the
foreign employer's connection with the United States. The application
of the Jones Act is now de facto discretionary in the lower courts, be-
cause of the diverse, inconsistent and unenumerated theories of "con-
tacts" now being used. Litigation in the federal courts is expensive and
time consuming, and a foreign seaman's statutory right to relief in the
United States ought not to be subject to the courts' self-styled interpreta-
tion of the Jones Act. The circuit courts are not in fact following the
direction of Lauritzen, which for all its faults was consistent in theory.
It is now incumbent upon the Supreme Court to reiterate clearly that
earlier holding.
If discretion is not the proper basis for deciding the applicable law
in a foreign seaman's suit, it has its proper place in deciding a forum non
conveniens controversy. Discretion in rendering a forum non con-
veniens decision, however, is not unbridled. Factors such as a United
States place of injury, unavailability of an alternate forum, or a United
States presence by either of the litigants ought to weigh heavily in favor
of retaining a foreign seaman's suit based on foreign law. In these in-
stances the plaintiff would be much more prejudiced by remanding the
suit to a foreign forum than the defendant would be by trying it in the
United States. Unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant,
the plaintiffs choice of forum should be disturbed only in exceptional
circumstances, because it is the plaintiff who initially seeks relief in a
given court. His choice of forum should not be frustrated by a mere
complained of inconvenience to the defense.
C. John Caskey
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